Models of the external syst,em interface of a computer have been successfully used to describe confidentiality requirements. This pa.per discusses the use of an external-interfa,ce model t1la.t supports the external consistency objective of Cla.rk and \,+Ylson as well as internal structura.1 constra.int,s needed t,o meet identified externa.l-int.erface requirementSs. These internal constraints identify a. vendor-supplied "Integrity Trusted Computing Base" tl1a.t handles informal proofs called "pedigrees." The increa.sing use of external-interface models, which this work illust,ra.tes, represents a paradigm shift in t#he construction of security models.
Introduction
The paradigm shift referred t.o in t,he t,it,le of this position paper was first reported at, t,lie 1001 Franconia Computer Security Workshop IV [l] and a.ga.iii more recently in [Z] . Briefly, t.he shift, is from models that attempt to define securit,y requirement,s in t,erms of controlled system entities towa,rds more comprehensive models that begin with wha.t a.re essentia.lly "bla.ck box" requirements on the syst.em int,erfa.ce. In the case of mandatory nondisclosure requirements, this shift was motivated by persistent, reservations about, t.he a.dequacy of tra.ditiona.1 access-cont,rol models [3] and ha.s led to newer models that include both noninterferencelike requirements a.nd more tra.ditiona.1 int.erna.1 constraints [4, 51. These newer models show t,ha.t, a.t the least, noninterference-like condit.ions can rule out a large variety of known covert, channels. Moreover, t,o bring traditional a.ccess cont,rol models up t,o a. comparable level of stringency, it is necessa.ry t.o make some *This paper reports on joint, work with Leonard J. La Padula. This work was supported in part. by t.he Nat.icmal Securit.y Agency under MITRE Project S3.50. significant additions, including a varia.nt. of tranquility, definitions of wl1a.t. const.itutes reading a.nd writing, I/O constraints ana.logous to simple securit.y a.nd the st,a.r propert,y, and a. scparat.e model of process scheduling [5] .
A taxonomy of st,a.ges of elaboration in the development of trusted systems was presented in [l] whose first three stages may be summarized as follows:
Trust o6jecfi~~es describe what. is to IW achieved by an information-processing cbnt.erprise. an important component of which is ;I colnput.iIlg s!.stern.
E~:2erl,al-illlerfnce rqrrirelucuts morlcls describe the belmviors of cornput ing s~st.rins, t lwir users.
and other entities in t.he systems' environment~s in such a way as to all0ca.W responsibilit,ies for a.chieving t,he identified t,rust, ol)jrct ives.
17,iernnl reyuirewenfs m0tlrl.s tlt~scribe, in a.11 abstract manner, how the system rt~sl~oli~il)ilit,ies given in the ext.ernal-illtcrfa.cc~ nlotl(~ls iIre Inc'l. wit.hiii t.he syst,em.
The primary purpose of [I] :. t wa< 0 st.lltly t.lle WOrli of Clark and Wilson [G] through t.he use of ext,ernalinterface modeling to see if a. similar gain in clarity would result. The init,ial result of t.his elTort. was the identification of severa. system-int,erface requirements, some ofJwhich were implicit in t,he work of Cla.rk and Wilson while ot.hers appea.retl to support the Clark-\\'ilsoii object.ives but. were not. containrtl in t.lieir famous work.
Aft,er t.he 1991 Franconia \\;orkshop, we sclcct.ctl ext.ernal-coiisist.ency a.s the most. proniinfWt~ of lhf various Clark-Wilson objectives and I>c~gal~ t,lle process of elaborating t.his object,ive t.0 obt.ain user responsibilities, external-interface requirenlcnts. and int,ernal system requirement,s.
The following sect.ions discuss the est.ernalconsistency object,ive, several srippor't.ing esl.erna.l-interface requirements, and some consequences for the internal structure of a computing system.
Formulating the External Consistency Objective
External consistency is the ability of a computing system to give correct informa.tion about, its external environment.
We begin with some typical examples. If an inventory program says tha.t a. warehouse contains given levels of various supplies, then the named supplies really can be found a.t the warehouse.
If a bank statement lists a particular balance for an account, then the balance is correct. as of t,he time it was issued. If a computing syst.em la.bels an output as "secret," then the contained information 1la.s a classification level dominated by "secret.." If a computing system issues a "sell" order for one million shares of stock, then that is the intent of it,s controlling orga.-nization.
A "sunrise" program correctly predicts sunrises. This last, somewhat atypical exa.mple, is useful because of its stark simplicity.
To model external consistency, we need to account for the fact that computers are capa.ble of producing output which users interpret as assertions about realworld entities (including, as a special ca.se, the visible behavior of the computing syst.em it,self). In working formally with such assertions, there a,re severa, difficulties that do not a.rise in the propositions of first-order logic.
The truth or falsity of a rea.l-world a.ssertion can vary with time unless it contains explicit qua.lifications explaining when it is true. Anot,her pot.ent.ial dificu1t.y with real-world assertions is that t,hey a.re only approximately correct unless level of accuracy is included in the assertion itself or in its context of interpreta.tion. For example, the following assertion is very unlikely to be exactly correct because most events do not happen on minute boundaries: system: The sun will rise at 5:4?' a.m. today. A third potential difficulty is that. reaLworld assertions tend to rely hea.vily on cont*ext for their mea.ning through the use of complex sema.ntic conventions.
For the sa.ke of a simple model, we view a. cornput,-ing system through a sta.bilizing filter t,ha.t. maps each assertion input to or received from t.he syst,em t.o a, corresponding "stable" assertion whose trut,h is timeindependent and whose accuracy is specified wit,hin the assertion itself. Thus, for modeling purposes, the above assertion might be replaced with the following: system: At Logan Airport on 29 September 1992, the sun rises between 5:46:5g a.m. and 5:47:01 a.m. In this form, the trut,h of the nssert.ion depends only on the language used to express it (English) a.nd on facts'of astronomy but not on context,ual information such as the time or place it was issued or t.he intent, of its author.
Taking the above examples a.nd issues into a.ccount,, we are led to the following securit.y objective:
External-Consistency Objective
Each assertion received from the system (a.nd recast. in stable form) is a true description of realit,y. This objective applies uniformly to all a.ssertions made by the system, including account status reports, fina.ucia.1 t.ransa.ctions, purport.ed facts about, t.he behavior of programs, a.nd so fort,li.
3 Requirements at the System Interface According t.o t,he taxonomy described in [l] . t.he second sta.ge, a,fter iclent.ifying ba.sic objectives.
is to a.llocate responsibilities t.0 t,he system and it.s users. This a.llocation should be done in such a way as 1.0 ensure effective support, even though users make mista,kes and, inJsome cases, are maliciously motiva.ted. After briefly mentioning user responsibilities, wedconsider some examples of syst,em responsibilit,ies, informa.1 presenta.tions of est,erna.l-illt.erface requirement.s, a.nd, finally, w1la.t would be involved in a. precise model.
The users must, agree on a common language for describing reaLworld or ot,her sit uat.ions, and this langua.ge must8 contain a. veiitlor-sul,l~lied sul,langrlage that is uuderstood by t.he comput iug syst.em so l.hat. t,lie syst,em ca.n meaningfully pa,rt.icipat.e in support,-ing the ext,ernal-consist,ency object,ive. The assertions and request.s which users input. t,o t,he syst,em must be correct; fa.iling this, users must, adequately warn t,lie system of possible errors.
In talking a.bout. system lesponsil,ilit,ies, we really mea.n vendor responsibilit.ies deriving from vendor a.dvert,isements about, support, for external consist.ency. We wa.nt. to discu& what, t,he vc,litlor-supplic:tl hardware/soft,ware configuration should do to supl)orl. est,erna.l consistency.
Coiisequent,ly, we are iiit.erc5t.4 in properties which are satisfied if 1 he syst.em is iust.allcd properly a.nd has not been inapl)ropriately t,ampered with.
There are surprisingly few a.ssertions t,hat, a. properly installed system might, t.ake full responsibilit,y for.
Only trivial examples such as the following come to mind: when the computer is turned on, it mentions that the system clock has gained three da.ys since it was last turned off. Let us see wha.t a vendor might be able to say in support of the examples we ha.ve considered so far.
The simplest typical example is, perhaps, that of a nondisclosure label. The accompanying security documentation might explain that an output label provides a security level which dominates the information displayed, subject to various caveats: users have correctly identified levels of inputs on which the outputs were based, and there might be problems relating to covert channels, inference, and/or aggregation.
A "Trusted Facility Manual" might furt.her explain how to identify the users who contributed the pot,ent,ia.lly mislabeled information on which the output was based. Notice that external consist,ency goes fa.r beyond the traditional notion of label integrit#y as discussed in the Trusted Network Interpretation of the TCSEC (TNI) [71.
In all of the remaining exa.mples, the correctness of the explicit or inferred output assertion depends on the correctness of bot,h a,pplica.tion softwa.re a.nd of user-supplied inputs.
Even the sunrise program depends not only on the correctness of its software but, a.lso on the correct setting of t.lie syst,em clock. In all of these cases, the system can support esterna.1 consistency by giving useful informa.tion about, who supplied the inputs on which a given out,put depends.
It ca.n do this, in particular, for assert.ions about, softwa.re correctness.
With sufficient care, it is possible for the system to fully comprehend the actions upon which correctness of output depends, to dist.inguish between relevant user actions and its own a.ctions, to t.a.ke responsibility for its actions, a.nd t.o provide feedback on user actions that a.re crucia.1 t,o the correct,ness of a. given output.
Warranties on Correctness of System output
In view of the above examples, the main externa.linterface requirement we shall impose in support of the external-consistency objective is the following:
Output-Warranty Requirement
The system shall ha.ve the a.bili t,y t,o ma.rk some of its outputs as "warrant,ed," mea.ning that these outputs a.re correct. provided the inputs on which they a.re ult.imat.ely based are themselves correct,.
We refer to the set of previous I/O event.s that t.he correctness of an out,put depends on as it.s I/O ba.sis. The I/O basis for an out,put is allowed t.o include previous outputs as a matter of convenience (e.g., the basis for this month's bank statement includes the closing balance from last month's bank balance, which is a,ppropriate, if it was not contested.) The above output-warranty requirement is closely related to the following ava.ilability requirement,, which we have not carefully studied: the syst,em must, be able to provide useful descriptions of I/O bases; in pa.rt.icular, these descriptions must not be too complex. In support of t.his availahi1it.y requirPn\(9lt. the syshem t.ypica.lly ident.ifies t,he user and/or nscr group responsible for ea.& a.ssertion in a basis. nut. t,he correct,-ness of this identificat,ion relies OII 1.111~ Ident,ifica,tion and Aut,hentica.tion (I c& A) process as we'll as on t,he correctness of administ,ra.tive informat.ion supplied by the system's security personnel.
Usually. users a.re interested in "reduced" bases from which unint.erest,ing cavea.ts have been st.ripped (e.g., correct,ness of t,he I ck A mechanism. correct.ness of administ rat.i\.cz rc~o~~tls. correctness of t,he syst,em clock. e1.c.).
The a.bove o~lt,l~ut,-~\ra.rrant,~ reqllirc~mc~nt. can be st,rengt,lieiietl considerably in order t.o accomm0tlat.e t.lie possibilit,y of incorrect iiiput,s. One caii require that outputs be based only on cert,ifiably correct, inputs and that t,he syst~em be able t,o discard even certified input,s if they are la.ter found t.o be incorrect. There are many possible forms of input, cert.ificat,ion. A common form is corrobora.tion, in which a. first input, must be endorsed by a. second input. from a different, properly aut,liorized user. The syst.em's abi1it.y to recognize corroborat.ed assert.ions may rest. part I\. on aclminist.rative procedures wliicli guaraiil~(~c. for c~sample. tSlia.t. no user has more t.lian 011~ logitt iiiliile.
An Error-Handling Requirement
So fa.r, we lia.ve dea.lt, only wit,li "posit.ive" informa.-tion. We now talk about what, t,o do when it, becomes evident, tl1a.t a. previously believed I/O assertion is incorrect.
We want. to select,ively invalit1at.e any other out,put, a.ssert,ions whose trut.li dt~pentls on t.liis one. The word 'select,ivcly" is import.allt. here. C'ollsitler. for example, an illput, event. which inst.alls a program t.liat. 1~a.s a virus in it.. We inight. IX> able t.0 tliscretlih t,liis pr0gra.m by erasing t,lie syst,eni's disks and reprogra.mmiiig the syst,em from scratch. I)llt. wr would prefcr a.n ea.sier, more selective approach. namely, t.liat. of just telling the system to disregard the infected program and all information that has been derived from it.
Error
Suppression Requirement
For any I/O assertion e, it is always possible to provide a later "inva.lidating" input e', such that, after e' has been input and processed, e will never a.gain be used in the I/O basis of any later output.
This requirement does not actua.lly say that an invalidating input must be selective. Selectivity is actually an ava.ila.bi1it.y requirement ra.ther t,ha.n an integrity requirement, but we mention se1ectivit.y in order to ward off trivia.1 solutions t.o the errorsuppression requirement.
Internal-Requirements Model
In order for a system to perform selective invaliclation of information, it is necessary for it to tra.ck how each output and intermedia,te result. has been derived. This derived requirement is essentia.lly the dntn con& 7luiZy requirement found in DOD Directive 5200.28.J[$] (parent document to the TCSEC).
Fulfillment of the da&continuit,y requirement amounts to keeping a complete register of the eveuts that have led to a giveu warranted result. This register, which we refer to a.s a pedigree, a.mounts to a.11 informal proof of the correctness of the result relative to its I/O basis. When oue looks closely, one discovers that these informal proofs rely not only on assertions in an I/O basis but on post,ulates, much a.s tra.ditiona.1 proofs rely on axioms. In this case, postulates are assertions whose truth is esta.blished through direct observation and processing by t.rusted softwa.re. Thus, there is a notion of Integrity Trusted Compuliug Bnse (ITCB) which produces these postula.tes. To provide an internal-requirements model tha.t guarantees the above external-interfa.ce requirements, it is necessary to describe au interfa.ce langua.ge a.nd to explain how it is used by the ITCB. One of the objectives of the internal-requirements model is t,o a.llow the construction of assertions tl1a.t are ba.sed ent.irely on corroborated inputs. Such assert,ions ha.ve pedigrees, all of whose input assertions are corroborated. Another objective is to provide an interfa.ce la.ngua.ge strong enough to support the kinds of wa.rrant.ies ma.de by vendors about their own softwa.re.
The fundamental elements of the internal system policy are user ids, data. items, data aggregates, pedigrees, and certified processes (CPs).
Dat,a, items are analogous to t,he "cont.rolled dat.a it.ems" of Clark aud Wilson.
Some data items a.re warranted assertions; some are "coufigura.tion items" of t,be sort found iu configuration-managemeut policies. Some warra.nt,ed assertions a.re role aut.lioriza.tions.
Some role autborizations allow certain users to fun&ion as security administrators.
Each user group is defined by a set of role authorizations.
Certified 
Preliminary Conclusions
Strong support for t,he ext,erna.l-consist,ency objective eiita.ils severa. ext,ernal-interface requiremen&, a.mong them a requirement for vendors t.0 produce limit,ed warrant.ies as t,o the correct.ness of orlt,put,s and a requirement.
t,o suppress erroneous irifornlal ion wlirn errors a.re discovered and report.etl t.0 t.lie syst.cAin.
Successful iiiil'lemelit.at.ioii of t lirse requiremenhs involves t.lle abi1it.y t,o formulate "stable" assert.ions whose trut,li does not. vary wit.11 t.he st,at.e of c-lie sys-tern and to maintain registries or "pedigrees" that justify these assertions relative to an assumed I/O basis. Pedigrees must rely not only on user-supplied inputs but also on direct observations and other "postulates" whose correctness is the responsibility of an ITCB. Using the mechanisms of an internal model, it should be possible to design an I & A mechanism that can produce pedigrees for assertions of the form "user U asserted A" in which all user assertions are corroborated.
The necessary I & A requirements are much stronger than those of theJTCSEC but not much stronger than those of the draft "Minimum Security Functional
Requirements" (MSFR) produced recently by the Federal INFOSEC Criteria Working Group. The main addition to the MSFR requirements is that, when a new user is introduced to the system, his identity must be corroborated by two system a.dministrators.
The internal model provides a natural fra.mework for discussing configuration management (CM), a.nd traditional CM ideas provide a. na.tura.1 starting point for the construction of pedigrees and ba.sis descriptions for certified procedures.
Such pedigrees rest on certified assertions about, the behavior of compilers, linkers, and configuration builders such as the UNIX "make" program.
These tools are exa.mples of TPs. One can show that it is not possible to construct reliable pedigrees for CPs without access mechanisms stronger than those found in UNIX. Consider dyna,mic linking, for example.
To conclude that a dyna.mica.lly linked program satisfies a. known specification, it is necessary to know tha.t it,s linked subrout.ines behave as expected.
In recognition of t,his, the UNIX ld.so linker checks version numbers.
But its checks only work if the semantics of version numbers is respected. That is, (a) programs are not modified without incrementing version numbers, a.nd (b) if only the minor version number is changed, then the new pr0gra.m is certified to satisfy the specifica.tion for the old program. Unfortuna.tely, UNIX does not directly support the enforcement of these constraints.
